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
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PAPERS

Supplementing the Hippocratic Oath Through an Analysis of Human Desires

Sam Eliassen

INTRODUCTION:

Modern practices in medical ethics and morality tend to be guided by unspecific oaths that pledge a new physician to a nebulous higher calling. These pledges endure from the ancient Hippocratic oath, which has guided medicine for centuries. While they often carry the right sentiment, these pledges do little for actual guidance on best medical practice. Specifically, the popular and modernized Hippocratic oath speaks to ideals of treating a holistic person, without offering a manner in which that can be achieved:

I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My responsibility includes these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick.
(Tyson)

While anyone who has ever visited a doctor will testify they should not be treated strictly as a medical anomaly or personal experiment, many would be hard-pressed to propose a model in which they can be sure to always receive adequate, considerate care. I plan to consider the relationships between a person's medical and non-medical states of being, in order to propose a model for medical practice that effectively considers both. Rather than discarding the modern Hippocratic oath for its inability to advise medical care, I propose that it should be supplemented by underlying philosophical framework that clearly articulates the role of doctor, patient, symptoms, and goals.

In proposing such a model, there are two sweeping categories to consider: the stimuli that are necessary for good health (including all medical considerations of a sound body and mind)

and the ideological aspects of being more than just a body (including lasting motivation and conviction to keep living). I propose that the physical necessities of life are causal to the ideological states that produce personal motivations. In other words, the reasons *why* we live are intrinsically tied to the reasons *that* we live. This cause-effect relationship, as I believe it, is the nexus of human experience at which medicine resides. The role of doctors, and the manner in which they should avoid “treating a fever chart,” is to aid in the translation of physiological reality to ideological motivation.

Our popular and modernized excerpt of the Hippocratic oath draws clear distinction between the functional realities of being alive and the integrated human environment to which these realities contribute. This distinction is not new, and it resides within multiple fields of philosophy. These broader considerations, outside of the strict realm of medical ethics, may be applied to the Hippocratic oath to round out and advise the human component of medicine. Within these broader fields of philosophy, we can look for relationship models between the physical and holistic person.

PEREIRA AND TIMMERMAN’S MODEL:

Professors of philosophy at Seton Hall University, Felipe Pereira and Travis Timmerman, frame components of human life with constructs that they call categorical and conditional desires (Pereira and Timmerman). Their application of these concepts mainly pertains to questions in immortality; nevertheless, their considerations are invaluable to illustrations in medical ethics for their ability to consider the relationship between a person’s survival-oriented needs and a person’s higher ideological motivations.

Conditional desires, as Pereira and Timmerman define the term, can be thought of as the bare necessities of human life. These desires are the inarguable, elemental thresholds that *must*

be met to sustain physical human life. Examples include oxygen, adequate temperatures, nutrition, and hydration, as these are all “conditional on being alive.” Though Pereira and Timmerman relate conditional desires almost exclusively to physical needs and satisfactions, it seems apparent that, from an evolutionary standpoint, aspects of mental health should be included. After all, it is necessary that an individual meets a sufficient mental threshold to survive via reproduction, and so pass their genes forward to a population. For example, a person with severe depression may no longer feel the need to meet conditional needs of nutrition, rest, or hydration. In this case, a conditional mental state outweighs conditional physical states to inform decisions, affecting an individual’s ability to survive. Seeing as mental states have a direct influence on physical states, we can group mental states along with conditional states. Conditional desires, for our purposes, can then be considered as the things, both mentally and physically, that are necessary for healthy survival.

Categorical desires are then considered to be the factors for which a person wants to keep living. These (typically more nebulous) motives include moral and ethical convictions that inspire a person, for better or for worse. Examples of categorical desires could be the drive to write a novel, to leave a legacy of lasting social change, or to raise a family. Pereira and Timmerman’s article defines categorical desires as “those that motivate someone to get out of bed in the morning.” (Pereira and Timmerman). For purposes in medical applications, Pereira and Timmerman’s definition will hold. Categorical desires remain the deep-seated convictions that enrich life, and therefore make it desirable.

THE INTEGRATION OF CATEGORICAL AND CONDITIONAL DESIRES:

Pereira and Timmerman consider these two aspects of life—categorical and conditional desires—to be more or less independent of each other. In most cases, however, it seems to be

self-evident that our physical survival and ideological convictions are mutually influential. The integration of these concepts is precisely addressed by the modern Hippocratic oath in consideration of treating a whole person. I intend to re-examine the relationship in Pereira and Timmerman's framework to specifically define the role of a doctor in terms of a patient's physical and ideological existence. My argument is as follows:

Premise 1: Conditional desires and categorical desires are mutually influential.

Premise 2: Modern medicine should strive to improve physical quality of life.

Premise 3: Medical practice should also aim to improve categorical quality of life in a manner that is desirable for the patient.

Conclusion: Therefore, a model for best medical practice will dually address the conditional and categorical person.

To prove conclusion one, I will look to the example of food and travel. The need for nutrition is conditional and unending. Regardless of all other factors, it is true that a person *must* eat to live. However, this need can be met in a variety of different ways. A person can eat Italian food, or Chinese or Thai. Regardless, they will have fuel for their body. Upon further consideration, it is equally true that a person's way of eating may affect their broad categorical desires. It follows rather directly that a person who loves Chinese food might feel motivated to go to China. If a person loves all sorts of food, then they might be motivated to travel the world. In this manner, we can see a basic example of correlated desires (P1). This framework of conditional and categorical desires is difficult at first to adopt.

Indeed, there seems to be several situations in which categorical desires exist separately from a conditional correlate. For example, one might look to a person in prison, who waits patiently for release because they want to see family members again. Since there is no direct

manner to fulfill conditional desires for relationships with family in separation, it may appear that the person's categorical desire of love toward their relatives is divorced from their conditional state. In this case, the categorical drive of familial love seems to be disembodied from a conditional state. This *prima facie* dissonance arises because of the complexity of mental conditional desires. However, the same relationship between conditional and categorical states holds true. Considering that meaningful relationships are conditionally necessary to healthy survival and adequate mental health, this person's categorical motivation of love can be seen as the result thereof. Even though the person's conditional need for relationship may be met non-traditionally, grounded in the hope of future contact, it is sufficient to give rise to a categorical desire of love that gets the person through each day. In a medical setting, the inmate's manner of fulfilling mental health needs for community through hope of seeing family can be communicated. The resultant desire to keep living and sustaining physical function is affected by this desire, motivating the person to stay healthy.

If another patient in the same prison is unable to meet conditional mental health needs for community through hope of family contact, they may no longer feel motivated by the categorical desire for love, and may not feel motivated to stay healthy in other ways, like diet and exercise. This isolated person may seek help from a mental health professional who will address their conditional mental state and propose other ways that they can fulfill needs for community. Manners of meeting conditional needs for this inmate could include a therapy group. After their mental conditional desires have been met, and a resultant categorical desire arises, they may feel motivated to sustain their conditional needs for physical wellbeing by nutrition and exercise. These examples support connectivity between conditional and categorical states, in addition to

the goals of healthcare to support physical wellbeing while allowing for patient incentive to keep living.

It is apparent, then, that the system of translation between conditional and categorical desires is incredibly complex. Indeed, the vast permutations of conditional needs and their means of fulfillment give rise to an extraordinarily large number of categorical states. However, this is not to say that our first premise is false. Regardless of complexity, this relationship remains the same: many of our conscious “reasons to live” are resultant of our manner in meeting a baseline physical threshold for survival, and vice versa. With this relationship considered, we can then turn our attention to premise two.

The belief that medicine should strive to support a person’s physical wellbeing and their desire to live is self-evident from our excerpt of the Hippocratic oath. Each factor aforementioned (i.e. family, economic state, personhood) falls under Pereira and Timmerman’s umbrella of categorical desires. These categorical desires then distinguish the human component that is so vital when treating people. Even the act of communicating a diagnosis requires an integrated approach to the human body and its categorical self. Though arguments can be raised against this relevance, they bear more criticism to the validity of the oath itself, and thus, are irrelevant to our interpretation, which hinges on the presumption that the Hippocratic oath is relevant to medical practice at all.

APPLICATIONS OF DESIRE INFLUENCES TO MEDICINE:

We have established that a) there is a difference between the experiences of categorical and conditional desires, b) though these experiences are different, they are related, and c) that changes in the conditional state of a person will have resounding influence on their fundamental motivating factors to continue living. This is, in essence, a form of mind-body relationship to

which medical practice can finally be applied. Having established that both the conditional and categorical states of a person are medically relevant, I propose the doctor's place is between the two. This relationship presents the ideal opportunity for medical practice to balance physiological reality with the holistic, categorical person. This positioning allows doctors to work towards a patient's individual goals, creating a life that is both physically well-kept *and* desirable.

At this intersection between states of conditional and categorical desires, the doctor has two roles. First, they must help a patient better understand their conditional state of reality. Second, they must listen to the patient and work with their categorical desires to best benefit the patient's conditional state.

It follows from any doctor's visit that the human body and mind are incredibly complex, requiring years of education and training to understand. It follows, then, that most non-doctors will be unable to understand the conditional state of their physical being. For this reason, the medical profession exists: to understand and treat conditional complexities that are too difficult to be understood by the ordinary person. The healthcare provider's role is then to help translate a person's conditional state so they can better understand it. From this understanding, the patient will develop categorical desires, against which they will weigh other input-output relations in their lives.

Take, for example, the case of a patient who has developed aggressive and advanced-stage cancer. A doctor can run a series of exams to understand the present reality of that person's conditional state. They will run MRIs, take biopsies, and carry out a plethora of other procedures to best understand the state of a person, in all medical specificity. This information will then be translated to the individual patient in the form of a diagnosis, and the doctor will outline potential

routes to improve the conditional state of the patient. This could include aggressive chemotherapy or more palatable (but potentially less effective) immunotherapy techniques.

It is then the patient's role to take this information and weigh their categorical desire to be healed against other categorical motivations. For example, if the patient is especially old, they may not want to lose any additional time with family members who fulfill their conditional need for relationship, and from whom arise the categorical state of emotional love. The patient may then choose a less aggressive treatment path in order to preserve their time left. The doctor's role is then to work with that categorical desire and improve the patient's conditional state to the best of their ability.

Though this example is specific, it outlines a manner of integration between philosophical and ethical considerations and medical observations. My proposal allows the doctor to simultaneously consider the patient's medical phenomena and their holistic state of being. The placement of modern medicine at the gate between conditional and categorical states fosters continued doctor-patient discourse and fully considers medical consent in the form of categorical desires. Moreover, this placement dually addresses problems in over and under-treatment within medicine, encouraging professionals to first examine the medical, conditional state of a patient in order to guide their holistic self-impressions. It is then the doctor's job to consider the person's wishes and work within those realms to better the conditional state in question.

CONCLUSION:

The modernized Hippocratic oath provides some guidance to treating the holistic person alongside their acute conditions. However, it does not provide any specific model or definition of medicine that aids in that goal. Rather than considering the medical conditions of human life in

specificity and attaching the afterthought of whole-person treatment, I propose that the methodology of physicians should reflect the interactions between both. With this framework in mind, questions about the physician's role in personal, ethical treatment are mitigated.

Some may argue that these distinctions have little impact on the intricacies of actual medical practice. However, self-understanding is vital in any position in society. By more narrowly defining the role of the physician in philosophical terms, we can model a system that considers all manner of human existence and behavior, and thus more adequately represents real situations in healthcare. Some manner of framework for *why* and *how* doctors are practicing has to be kept in mind in order to create a future in medicine in which we can live to our own determined standards. I believe it is vital to consider a system in which the holistic person is recognized without a loss of medical specificity, and in which conversation is encouraged at every point.

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Sam Eliassen

Hey! My name is Sam Eliassen (he/him), and I'm a freshman at the UI studying neuroscience on the pre-med track. I work in the Psychiatry and Early Neurobiological Development Lab under Dr. Hanna Stevens, and I write for a few student publications, including Ink Lit Mag and the Iowa Honors Program newsletters. I'm passionate about the intersection of medical care and effective communication, and I think this is often best explored through philosophy. In my free time, you can probably find me in a purple hammock on the Pentacrest.

The Difficulties of Thi Nguyen's Epistemic Bubbles

Amna Haider

Thi Nguyen (2018) identifies two traditionally blurred but distinct phenomena that infringe on healthy epistemic practices: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Nguyen defines echo chamber as a “social epistemic structure in which other relevant voices have been actively discredited” (Nguyen 2018: 2). An epistemic bubble, on the other hand, is “a social structure which has inadequate coverage through a process of exclusion by omission” (Nguyen 2018: 3). According to Nguyen, escaping an epistemic bubble is a simple fix while escaping an echo chamber is a much more difficult feat. However, Nguyen has deeply overestimated the fragility of an epistemic bubble for both the epistemically lazy (those who rely on one source to form beliefs) *and* the virtuous (those who try to gather information from multiple sources). I will argue here against Nguyen's proposed solution to “easily shattering” an epistemic bubble by merely exposing oneself to excluded information. In the context of news-sharing, I argue that this solution is unproductive for two reasons. The first reason is that it is not as easy for an individual to accept testimonial evidence outside of one's bubble due to naturally occurring and unmanipulated trust. The second reason is that on top of this, some pertinent and relevant events can be omitted by nearly all media organizations and only accessed through niche or unreachable networks, and accessing those is too demanding on the epistemic agent (EA). Ultimately, I conclude that epistemic bubbles cannot be necessarily shattered, but they can be widened by an individual and/or collectively managed through reforming investigative and reporting practices of media organizations.

I will first lay out the concepts that build on Nguyen's work. For the purposes of this paper, testimony is defined as written or spoken assertions intended to carry information, and the

import of testimony depends on whether the EA trusts the testifier. To reiterate, echo chambers and epistemic bubbles are both social epistemic structures, except the former actively discredits information while the latter simply excludes information. Members of echo chambers are members in virtue of sharing some set of core beliefs, including beliefs that preemptively undermine outside sources (Nguyen 2018: 6). Epistemic bubbles can form accidentally or deliberately through: ‘selective exposure’ in which an individual tends to seek out like-minded sources, and deliberate modification of that individual’s landscape by external agents like filtering algorithms of search engines and media censorship. I will primarily focus on the individual and collective difficulty to escape epistemic bubbles due to the nature of current media and news-reporting platforms. ‘News’ is noteworthy information about recent worldwide events that is intended towards a large audience (Rini 2017: 44). I assume that a person’s knowledge of global events is primarily based on the testimony from major media platforms like Cable News Network (CNN), National Public Radio (NPR), and social media. The crux of Nguyen’s paper is that echo chambers are more robust than epistemic bubbles because a chamber member’s encounter of outside content will only reinforce his/her beliefs inside it (Nguyen 2018: 14). On the other hand, epistemic bubbles can be easily taken down because they exclude available information that can be retrieved beyond an individual’s bubble or standard network (Nguyen 2018: 7). However, Nguyen does not consider this solution’s feasibility or what causes somebody to recognize an act of omission. I will address these questions and first argue that while members of epistemic bubbles might not have a maliciously manipulated sense of trust, these bubbles are still characterized as networks of trust.

Nguyen claims that those in epistemic bubbles do not have background information on outside sources to be able to dismiss them like they would an echo chamber (Nguyen 2018: 7).

But an authoritative figure within the bubble does not need to actively discredit an outside source for someone in an epistemic bubble to be less willing to trust that source and consequently be willing to rely on its evidence. As Nguyen mentions, we gravitate towards listening to and trusting those that are like us (Nguyen 2018: 4). Philosopher Regina Rini attaches this idea to partisan affiliation. If I am a moderate conservative and my social media network consists of conservatives who all share articles from *The American Conservative*, then I am only exposed to issues that are important to conservatives. Rini argues that such “partisan-in-testimony-reception” implies that I trust the members in my sphere have accurate notions of what is politically important (Rini 2017: 53). Simultaneously, these same sources could ‘selectively report’ on a Democratic politician’s negative behavior in another country while omitting a report on the successful policy actions made by that politician. This gives rise that I am in an epistemic bubble. Let’s suppose my classmate shares a CNN article containing the omitted information regarding the politician’s positive policy actions. Prior to this moment, I already formed a belief about the politician based on the trust I put into my own network about what is politically important. Although I was exposed to that information, I would be less influenced by this evidence because I had already received justification for my beliefs about the candidate from the sources within my bubble. The corroboration of the negative-behavior story in my network is mistakenly attached to greater relevance and reliability. Note that this is different from the nature of an echo chamber, because perceiving information outside my network does not reinforce my own beliefs or strengthen them; I am just less inclined to pay attention or consider the policy news as equally important as the news brought up by the members of my epistemic bubble.

This has two implications. The first is that unfamiliar sources outside of an EA’s epistemic bubble garner less attention and trust. Sally’s epistemic bubble shaped around CNN

does not actively discredit information she finds on FOX, but she is more likely to carry a bias that FOX offers less pertinent information than CNN would. This does not mean that Sally has background knowledge about FOX News, but she has already grounded trust in CNN which prioritizes different issues than FOX. Such priorities might be seemingly descriptive claims about characterological evidence about politicians, but they ultimately reflect the value judgements of CNN which Sally agrees with (Rini 2017: 52-53). The first implication gives rise to the second in that an assumption of trust between members in the bubble is that those testifiers share all the relevant information that is needed to be known by the EA. In other words, a trusted testimony by a media source is one that appears on the surface to capture the full relevant story. The victims of epistemic bubbles will assume that all the relevant information is presented by the trusted testifier. An EA does not feel compelled to look any further unless they have reason to believe that the testifier is hiding something, but this contradicts the trust that is already present. Therefore, exposure to missed information is not as influential as Nguyen asserts.

One could object to this premise by claiming that I am overestimating an EA's trust towards the sources within their epistemic bubble. However, if person A relies on source B's presentation of news, then it follows that this person is not an expert or directly observed the event in the first place. Because of this, Person A has no way to confirm that source B's news claims are true and justified except by assessing source B's honesty. As John Hardwig argues, person A must trust B in order to have good reasons to believe what B claims (Hardwig 1971: 700). Omissions of information do not necessarily imply that a source is being untrustworthy. Therefore, if person A has consistently relied on source B for news and concludes that source B is in a position to accurately report news, then there is no good reason for person A to look further for alternative accounts of a news story. Secondly, as Nguyen puts it as 'bootstrapped

corroboration', an epistemic bubble's presentation of frequent agreement causes an EA to mistakenly "over-inflate" their self-confidence and believe that all the necessary information or events have been covered. The more self-confidence and trust within that bubble through repeated experiences, the EA feels it less necessary to search for contradicting information and to consider its weightiness equal to the bubble's information.

I argued that epistemic bubbles are characterized by trust and leave less room for outside evidence. I will now argue that it is also difficult exposing an EA to excluded information due to the current state of media platforms. Be it through Google news search, Facebook, or broadcast channels like CNN and NPR, all these platforms inevitably exclude pertinent news. This is to be expected as the world is "overstuffed" with information; some filtering is inevitable (Nguyen 2018: 3). There are often events that make the headlines across all platforms and become domineering in multiple news cycles which overshadows other critical news. Some stories go unreported at all by major media platforms and can only be accessed through niche networks. For example, characterized as the 'Invisible Crisis,' the Yemen famine that started in 2016 is a direct result of the Saudi-led intervention and blockade against the country. The UN has reported the famine as the "world's worst humanitarian crisis" as around nine million civilians have been affected and the only source of relief is external aid (Lu 2018). Saudi Arabia has been considered an important U.S. ally in the United States, but only specialty networks such as *Human Rights Watch* or subsections of major media organizations report updates on the situation. Major media organizations have not spotlighted this clearly relevant event through popular 'breaking news' headlines or within broadcast coverage. Such exclusion of information does not bring productive media attention to this crisis, inevitably leading to epistemic bubbles being formed around anyone that stays updated through major media organizations. Thus, epistemic bubbles further

exasperate the lack of attention and public outcry around injustices as Nguyen points out. Nguyen uses the example of his hypothetical social network that is composed only of arts-focused professors. Nguyen is continually updated on the “New York Art scene” but actually entirely misses the “relevant” development that his country was becoming more fascist (Nguyen 2018: 3). This is a case of accidental bad coverage. His solution to this is to amass more information, probably through major news outlets that report on global and domestic affairs. However, this does not shatter an epistemic bubble. On the contrary, deliberately imposed epistemic bubbles or not, increased exposure to once omitted facts means adding more sources to his epistemic landscape. Those sources also inevitably omit relevant facts elsewhere. Nguyen would then have more sources in his network, but also accumulated omitted information because major media platforms themselves still do not report on incredibly relevant stories like the famine, thus increasing the size of his bubble rather than shattering it. Nguyen may try to search for sources that go beyond art-related topics, but major media platforms tend to corroborate similar news stories and thus add on to the size of his epistemic bubble. It takes a Google search of the omitted information itself like ‘Blockade of Yemen’ to be able to access web pages discussing the famine. However, this does not logically interact with the nature of an epistemic bubble. An epistemic bubble omits information that may otherwise be available—but the fact that this information is excluded makes the EA unaware that such information exists in the first place. Nguyen does not consider this difficulty of escaping epistemic bubbles when there are *unknown* unknowns. Theoretically, an epistemic bubble cannot be shattered if unknown information exists that the epistemic agent does not recognize nor has access to.

This brings me to my next point regarding how the role of trust in one’s own epistemic bubble interacts with media structure to undermine one’s ability to recognize omissions. Not

every media organization will interview the same people nor will be offered the same information. Simultaneously, as I just argued, an EA caught in an epistemic bubble tends to perceive the information given by sources in his/her bubble as all the information available. Consider a bleak scenario in which a neighborhood is brought outside to observe a blazing house fire. Neighbor A approaches her close Neighbor B to ask what happened. To Neighbor A's epistemic luck, Neighbor B had witnessed the events leading to the fire in that the homeowner lit off a firework that landed on the roof during their bonfire. News reporters and police arrive at the scene and ask the nearest Neighbor C, what happened. Neighbor C only happened to witness the bonfire smoke but informs them that it was likely the bonfire that caused the house to catch fire. Neighbor A and B go back inside before the police approach them for questioning. The actual cause goes unreported; a plausible but false story crosses the local news headlines. This translates to major media organizations who investigate global news, revealing a greater disparity between individual testifiers engaged in certain events and what is reported to large audiences. Despite the observable facts that Yemen is undergoing a famine affecting millions of people because of the Saudi blockade, it is still omitted from major news sources, but audiences continue to depend on these sources for world updates.

Major media platforms enlarging one's epistemic bubble due to the exclusion of information explains their political power. In foreign policy, the media is known to 'shape public opinion' by deliberately selecting topics to present. Media sources and technological filtering dictate what information is easy to access to the public, consequently 'setting the agenda' for what the public should care about. One might argue that selective reporting by major media is a healthy filtering of information based on priority; one can alternatively investigate the niche networks to learn about what was missed by those heavily relied-upon media organizations.

Nguyen would posit this objection as he states in his own paper that “insofar that information [*is*] available... then members of epistemic bubbles are failing to live up to their epistemic duties, which includes actively gathering relevant data.” Nguyen then goes on to pin blame on EAs that fail to escape epistemic bubbles is usually due to epistemic laziness (Nguyen 2018: 14).

However, my response to this is that this alternative is too burdening for an EA and does not fare any more effectively than re-evaluating how the media systemically controls information flow.

With the finite time that someone has, it is highly unlikely that one is able to identify the omissions of information within their own networks or finds that excluded information from investigating all information platforms. Moreover, as shown, an epistemically virtuous person can try to escape an epistemic bubble by going great lengths to stay informed on various topics, but the bubble can never truly be shattered because of the media’s neglect to spotlight relevant issues. In the case of Yemen, a morally virtuous scientist that has no investable interest or time in reading the specific global health section of NPR would not know about the incident unless someone in his social network or epistemic landscape coincidentally brings up the unknowns. Either this, or an EA impossibly attempts to peruse all media platforms. Yet again, amassing all this information still leaves the possibility that there is a relevant development that one missed because it is unreported in one’s language or another topic fills the news cycles.

In conclusion, epistemic bubbles are characterized by trust, which does not give a reason for an EA to search for outside sources that have not yet built that kind of trust. In turn, even if an EA does diversify and expand their network, the EA has finite capacity to do so and all media organizations omit pieces of relevant data due to selective reporting. An EA only expands his or her epistemic bubble rather than shatters it. Identifying omitted data that motivates one to leave an epistemic bubble in the first place is also a paradoxical feat. I hope to have shown that simply

exposing oneself to more knowledge is not a feasible solution to shattering an epistemic bubble when the systems in charge of reporting information remain imperfect.

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Amna Haider

Amna Haider (she/her/hers) is a third-year undergraduate student double majoring in Philosophy and International Relations, while also pursuing a Certificate in Human Rights. She is mostly interested in value theory and applied ethics. However, epistemology has a special place in her heart, as it is the area of philosophy she was first introduced to that made her decide to become a philosophy major!

Our Right to Mental Privacy

Erin Golden

As neuroscientific methods progress toward better decoding of thought, the concern of whether we have a right to mental privacy looms ever larger. In her paper “Mindreading and Privacy,” Adina Roskies distinguishes between “brainreading” and “mindreading” in order to more clearly visualize neuroscience’s progress toward reading thoughts.¹ Roskies defines brainreading as encompassing one end of a spectrum, relying on crude correlations between physical states and mental states, and mindreading as encompassing the other end of the spectrum, relying on more detailed correlations.² Mindreading is, by her definition, the practice of decoding the contents and detail of thought that could be expressed with language.³ Therefore, Roskies creates a spectrum of less to more detailed content that may be inferred with neuroimaging. On this spectrum, current methods, like the polygraph, fall firmly toward the brainreading end. However, given the potential for neuroscientific methods to advance into mindreading, we must assess whether we have a right to mental privacy and how this right may be established. As neuroscientific research moves closer to mindreading and the question of whether we have a right to mental privacy becomes more pressing, I propose we turn to legal precedent for an answer. As legal precedent protects against communicative self-incrimination, I believe this same precedent should also encompass mindreading, though not cruder forms of brainreading like those neuroscience can produce today, because these mindreading methods would constitute communicative self-incrimination.

¹ Adina Roskies, “Mindreading and Privacy,” *The cognitive neurosciences* (2014): 1004.

² Roskies, “Mindreading and Privacy,” 1004.

³ Roskies, “Mindreading and Privacy,” 1004.

Take, for example, a scenario in which we possess neuroscientific methods capable of what Roskies defines as mindreading: we can image a person's brain and accurately and specifically determine the nature and content of their thoughts. This allows us to tell whether the person is lying and what they are lying about. We can even decode an individual's inner speech, the coherent thoughts a person internally expresses. In this scenario there is an individual, Person A, who is a suspect in a murder investigation. There is little evidence available, so investigators want to rely on the advanced neuroimaging method. Should investigators use the neuroimaging method to question Person A and her thoughts? Does Person A have a legal right to mental privacy?

With neuroscientific progress pushing ever closer toward mindreading, the right to mental privacy will need to be more clearly established. One way to establish this right is through legal protections for mental privacy created by court decisions as these decisions create precedent and legal foundations for rights. Should a case like Person A's arise, courts will need to address where the line is between legally admissible physical evidence (brainreading) and protected personal testimony (mindreading) in relation to neuroimaging results. However, in her paper "Mindreading and Privacy", Adina Roskies states that while there is some basis for legal rights to mental privacy, this basis is shaky, especially regarding neuroscience. She therefore feels we do not have a legal foundation for believing that our right to mental privacy is protected as nowhere in the Constitution does the right to privacy explicitly appear.⁴

Neuroimaging capable of mindreading does not seem to fit into Roskies' conception of what current legal precedent protects regarding mental privacy, but I would argue that we have the foundations of protection for mental privacy in current legal precedent. Take, for example,

⁴ Roskies, "Mindreading and Privacy," 1009.

our fifth amendment right prohibiting the government from compelling individuals to self-incriminate. The decision in *Schmerber v. California* affirms that the fifth amendment protects individuals from being compelled to *communicatively* incriminate themselves.⁵ Individuals may *biologically* incriminate themselves in such cases as being forced to give DNA samples for investigation, but I would argue contrary to Roskies that, in the case of mindreading, the much more direct information taken from mindreading should fall under communicative self-incrimination were it to be used in court against an individual.⁶ Therefore, though the evidence gathered from Person A through neuroscientific mindreading might be physical in nature, its use would be to effectively read A's mental states in a way that is, by Roskies' definition, comparable to speech. As the fifth amendment and the decision in *Schmerber v. California* state that individuals may not be coerced into communicatively incriminating themselves, Person A would be protected from self-incrimination, such as through warrants being issued for her mindreading data, because the evidence gathered from mindreading would be communicative testimony. I differ from Roskies in that I believe this evidence from mindreading would not be legally accessible as Person A's right to mental privacy would protect her from being coerced into undergoing such mindreading.

The line for what is and is not protected by this right to mental privacy would be drawn where the data decoded by neuroscientific methods becomes comparable to speech. For example, in brainreading cases such as polygraphy (the use of lie detectors), data can only be used to draw rough correlations between physical states and inferred mental states.⁷ These brainreading

⁵ "Schmerber v. California," Oyez, accessed November 6, 2020, <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1965/658>.

⁶ Oyez, "Schmerber v. California."

⁷ Paul Root Wolpe, Kenneth R. Foster, and Daniel D. Langleben, "Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils," *The American Journal of Bioethics* 10, no. 10 (2010): 45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2010.519238>.

methods therefore cannot be used to decode an individual's thoughts in a way comparable to communicative testimony. In the case of polygraphy, data are only conducive to the inference that an individual is experiencing sympathetic nervous system activation.⁸ This inference cannot be used with complete accuracy to differentiate between anxiety and deception. This method therefore does not come close to determining the nature of the individual's thoughts that may be leading to this nervous system arousal. As brainreading only produces crude data, the individual undergoing this brainreading would not have protections for mental privacy as the data would not emulate the complexity and context of speech. However, if the data from a mindreading neuroimaging method were able to identify the specific nature of the individual's thoughts and feelings, such as whether the person is anxious about being interrogated or whether they are lying in a specific way, this data would be from a mindreading method and would be close enough to speech to be protected by the right to privacy.

Therefore, I propose that we address the mounting threat of invasion of mental privacy by mindreading methods through reliance on existing legal precedent that protects against communicative self-incrimination. As mindreading would yield data comparable to speech, this data should be considered communicative self-incrimination and thus be protected by the right to privacy.

⁸ Paul Root Wolpe, Kenneth R. Foster, and Daniel D. Langleben, "Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils".

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Erin Golden

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Plato's Tripartition of the Soul

Maria Fernanda Carriel

The fourth book of Plato's *Republic* introduces the reader to Plato's tripartition of the soul argument (439d3-439e4). Given the existence of irreconcilable conflicts existing between desires and employing his Principle of Opposites (PO) and Principle of Qualification (PQ), Plato deduces that the soul has parts. For Plato, human souls are divided into three parts: Rational, Spirited and Appetitive. In this paper, I am going to defend Plato's argumentation for his division of the soul. I will go over different cases of irresolvable conflict between human desires and indicate via PO & PQ how these truly pertain to separate parts of our souls. Lastly, I will comment on the strengths of the tripartition of the soul argument.

To comprehend Plato's argument, the concepts of the Principle of Opposites, the Principle of Qualification and Formal objects need to be understood. The Principle of Opposites (PO) is defined as: The same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time (436b8-436b9)¹. To support this claim Plato presents different actions that together can be categorized as pairs of mutual opposites: assenting and dissenting, wanting something and rejecting said something, etc (437b-437b5)¹. In simpler terms, this principle proposes that an entity cannot have opposing desires or motivations towards some particular object. If this is true in the soul, then we will be able to assert that the soul has parts (Swanson)³. Additionally we have the Principle of Qualification (PQ) which establishes: In the case of all things that are related to something, those that are of a particular sort are related to a particular sort of thing, while those that are just themselves are related to a thing that is just itself (438a7-437b1)¹. Plato supports this principle by presenting cases of things that are conceived by their relationship to another: The greater is such as to be greater than X (438b4-438b5)¹. This

logical principle posits that relational properties have formal objects. The formal object of any relation R is the property F that Y must have if it is to be possible for X to stand in the relation R to Y. To support this claim, Plato asks the following: Is thirst a thirst for hot drink or cold, or much drink or little, or-in a word- for drink of a certain sort? (437d9-437d10)¹. To this, he responds that thirst itself is for the very thing it is in its nature to be an appetite for: drink itself (437e4-437e6)¹. Therefore, the formal object in this case is anything that is drinkable, whether it be coffee, water, soda, etc (Swanson)³.

Plato argues that the human soul consists of three parts, each of these parts possessing a particular way of looking at and responding to the external world (439d3-439e4)¹. The rational element is the one that calculates (439d3-439d5)¹, the one in charge of making decisions on what is good for the entire soul and the body. The Spirited part is where emotions like shame, anger, righteous indignation and courageous daring concentrate (Swanson)³. The irrational and appetitive is the one that feels passion, hungers, thirsts and pleasures (439d6-439d7)¹. The formal object of the rational part is the good, the formal object of the appetitive part are cravings for food, drink, sex and lastly, the formal object of the spirit part is honor. This division of the soul heavily relies on the notion of irresolvable conflict between the formal objects of desire between these three parts (Swanson)³.

Plato argues that when there exists conflict between two appetitive desires, there can be a 'compromise' formal object of desire that the appetitive part can form a new attitude to. For example, let's say you are hungry on a road trip, but you just want to eat chicken nuggets. Now, let's also suppose that you have always disliked Burger King's food. All of the exits you have seen so far on the highway; all have a Burger King. You look up for other places that sell nuggets in your GPS and they are all far away. Given the circumstances, your appetitive part needs to form a

compromise object of desire. You initially wanted chicken nuggets, but you also did not want to eat at Burger King, but given the situation you are in, you are willing to form a new attitude. Your initial desire was for chicken nuggets, your initial aversion was for Burger King's food. Given Plato's Principle of Qualification, you now have a compromise object of desire available to you for which you could form a new attitude: Burger King's chicken nuggets. Therefore depending on how much you really want to eat chicken nuggets or how much you hate Burger king, you will either decide not to eat as you just can't eat at Burger king or crave chicken nuggets so much that you do end up at Burger King. Since the appetitive part can form a new attitude towards this new formal object of desire, the desires of the appetitive part cannot be said to be in irremediable conflict (Swanson)².

On the opposite hand, we also seem to have desires that, given their opposite nature, are always going to clash and bring about irreconcilable conflict. For example, let's say I am a diabetic and my doctor told me that I could not eat anything sugary because it would severely worsen my condition. One day at the office, it is someone's birthday and my co-workers offer me some chocolate cake. I really want to eat the chocolate cake, because chocolate is delicious and sugary. But I also really don't want to eat the cake as I know it will not be good for my health. The part of my soul that wants to eat the cake is the appetitive whilst the one that does not want the cake is the rational. The formal object of my appetitive part in this case is eating anything sugary, as that is what I am craving at that moment. On the other hand, the formal object of my rational part is to not eat anything sugary (as it makes my diabetes worse). In Plato's view, the formal object of rational desire is the good while that of rational aversion is the bad. This is ultimately why no compromise is possible between these two desires. The rational element always chooses the good because this part is concerned with what is best for the entirety of our soul. For that reason, Plato

proposes that the rational part should rule over the others since it is wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul (441e3-e5)¹. Thus, in cases of irremediable conflict (such as this one), the formal object of the rational desire can't form a compromise attitude with the appetitive desire. My aversion to eating something sugary is a result of rational calculation, of me thinking on my well-being. Reason tells me that eating something sugary (like the chocolate cake) is not good for my soul or my body. A compromise object of desire for this case would be something like not-good food eat (i.e. eating something that is not good for us). This cannot be a compromise object as this is exactly what reason did not want to do from the beginning. According to the Principle of opposites, these two desires must be assigned to different things, as they pull the soul in truly opposite directions (Swanson)².

Another case of irresolvable conflict can be seen between rational and spirited desires. For this case, let's think of a serial-rapist that has a family. This man has two daughters who he loves very much and think of him as the best father there is. He has been in love with his wife for 20 years and has never thought about being in a romantic relationship with anyone else since they got together. At some point when he was a young adult, he developed a desire to rape 20-year old women. As much as he loves his wife, he is not satisfied with their sex life. The only thing that truly gives him sexual gratification is raping young women. As a father and a husband, he feels disgusted with himself. He is deeply ashamed, as he knows his family would not approve of this and he would punish whoever did this to the women in his family. For this case, his appetitive part tells him to fulfill his sexual desires. On the other hand, his spirited part finds what he does to be dishonorable, awful and immoral. The formal object of desire of the spirited part is honor. Plato proposes that the spirited part of the soul is the one most likely to become the ally of reason (440b-440b4)¹. He supports this by claiming there are instances in which we let ourselves be carried

away by our irrational appetitive desires. This causes in us an extreme sense of frustration, anger and even shame (440b-440b4) ¹. We normally feel this way after doing blame-worthy, shameful things. On the other hand, performing praise-worthy actions make us feel good about ourselves. This is why when an unjust act is committed, our spirited part tends to disapprove and fight back “not ceasing its noble efforts until it achieves its purpose or dies” (440d) ¹. Therefore, a compromise object is impossible in this case: His appetitive part desires to rape young women. He could try to engage in moral and healthy sexual practices (to satisfy his Spirited part), but he will not be sexually satisfied by this. Neither will his spirited part form a new attitude about such a dishonorable act. Therefore, according to the Principle of Opposites, these two desires must be assigned to different things as they truly pull the soul in opposite directions (Swanson)².

Having proposed cases of irremediable conflict between the different parts of the soul, it is clear how these are caused by desires of different natures, formed in accordance with the different formal objects of their respective soul parts. The main strengths of Plato’s argument are how intuitive (once explained) it appears and how it serves to make sense of human behavior.

The tripartition of the soul argument seems to be a great explanatory tool when dealing with cases of motivational conflicts like instances of *Akrasia* – when we know what the best course of action is, but we still feel inclined to act in another “more pleasurable” way. This can be easily explained by the tripartition argument by claiming that each part of the soul has its own way of discerning the world and reacting to it. Therefore, when we act how the akratic person would, we do so because we are being driven to act against what we know as good by either our appetitive or spirited part. This provides a justification to the question of: Why do reasonable individuals do unreasonable things? Plato considers a wise man, to be that who is ruled by reason. His spirited and appetitive desires align with what the rational part disposes, as it knows what is advantageous

– both for each part and for the whole (422c4 – 422c6) ¹. I like this claim because it drove me to the following conclusion: the un-wise man is the one that is ruled by either his appetitive or spirited part, yet this man is still capable of rational deliberation. Us being ruled by other parts of our soul does not mean that the rational part can never intervene, as it still forms part of it. Therefore, one who acts in an akratic fashion is not ignorant regarding the good, as they are capable of discerning the best way of acting. They make the deliberate choice to act against reason, as they prioritize their appetitive or spirited desires.

Another positive trait of this argument is how each part of the soul does not only interpret the world in a certain way, but also performs a specific job in each of our lives. The rational part is the one that allows us to perform philosophical and scientific inquiry. It is the one that allows us to use logic and reason-based methods to search for truth in the world. The Spirited part is the one that allows us to overcome obstacles and challenges in our lives via courageous daring. It allows us to fight for what we believe in via righteous indignation. Lastly, the appetitive part is the one that tends for our biological needs – sex, food, drink, etc. In a very basic sense, we need our appetitive part to pursue these to survive. Plato’s three parts of the soul seem to me to universally represent human nature.

Finally, modern theories of mind seem to be rooted in Plato’s argument. In the field of cognitive psychology, many scholars argue that our minds can be divided into different parts. This can be seen in cases of Dual Process theories (In which our minds are divided into two systems based on intuition and higher-order reasoning)⁴ Freud’s postulates for the Preconscious, Conscious (has all thoughts) and Unconscious Mind (the Unconscious storing feelings, thoughts, urges) and others. These theories seemed to be in some way, inspired by Plato’s tripartition of the soul. This argument still being relevant nowadays, inspiring the advancement of new theories regarding

human consciousness, shows to me its usefulness in describing human behavior and aiding us in understanding the reasons behind our actions.

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Maria Fernanda Carriel

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On Xunzi's *Human Nature is Bad*

David Uritu

Throughout history, people have always appealed to some sort of external authority to explain morality. One of the earliest forms of this argument comes from the Confucian philosopher Xunzi, who wrote a chapter titled “Human Nature is Bad.” In that chapter, he claims that human nature has no innate goodness, but rather that we are naturally selfish and chaotic creatures whose only hope of morality comes from the wisdom of a group of Sage Kings, whose rituals allowed for morality only by deliberately undermining human nature (Xunzi, 2014). However, Xunzi’s claim that goodness cannot be found naturally in humans seems to go against the evolutionary evidence that we are a social species. I will lay out Xunzi’s argument, then show how the behavior of other social species such as chimpanzees, as well as discoveries regarding natural selection, prove that goodness, as Xunzi himself defines it, is in fact natural, and a result of our evolution as a species.

Xunzi frames his argument as a response to another Confucian philosopher, Mencius. In Mencius’s view, everything good has a start within us, including a general sense of morality and a tendency for goodness, like an internal seed that can be watered and tended to, and that can grow into order and civilization. Xunzi’s answer to this claim is clear: human nature contains only that which involves our base desires, such as a fondness for profit, for that which is pleasing to the eye, as well as hatred and dislike, all of which lead to chaos and violence. Thus, he postulates, all that is good in human society and life comes from an external “deliberate effort”(Xunzi, 2014, pg. 248). First, I think it is important to identify what exactly Xunzi means by goodness. In his own words, goodness is understood as “being correct, ordered, peaceful, and controlled,” (Xunzi, 2014, pg. 252) as well as substituting one’s wellbeing for another, or

altruism. Second, it is important to note that when saying *deliberate effort*, Xunzi is referring to something specific, which comes from and is chiefly exemplified through a series of “rituals,” (Xunzi, 2014, pg. 248) created by the ancient Sage Kings of Chinese history. The semi-divine Sage Kings represent Chinese culture and civilization itself, as well as, like all other cultures, the installation of order from chaos, wisdom from ignorance, and a divine or semi-divine founder myth. It is important to note that when Xunzi refers to ritual, he means traditions and customs such as funerals, marriages, ancestral sacrifice, etc., and not governmental laws. This distinction is important because governmental laws are created and enforced by a ruling power to regulate an already developed culture, and thus is indicative of administrative necessities, not a culture’s moral convictions and practices. I do not want to say that rituals, in the sense of customs, are not instrumental and crucial to our development as a species and the evolution of our morality; rather, I seek to prove that our goodness is found within us naturally, not bestowed on us by an external force.

The most salient counterexample to Xunzi’s argument can be found in the behavior of other social species, primarily chimpanzees. Primatologist Frans de Waal is one of the leading proponents of the idea that morality is drawn from evolution, and his experiments have resulted in clear evidence that chimpanzees are capable of showcasing primitive versions of each of the tenets that comprise Xunzi’s definition of goodness. Humans are biologically nearly identical to chimpanzees as fellow primates, sharing as much as 99% of our DNA according to the AAAS (Gibbons, 2012), and have many behavioral similarities as a social species. De Waal proposes that morality, despite its many variants from culture to culture and from person to person, is always founded on two pillars, empathy and reciprocity, under which subcategories such as compassion, fairness, and reconciliation are to be found. This is very similar to how Xunzi

selection can be seen as implying a sense of constant contest, and a naturally self-centered, aggressive attitude in order to pass one's individual genes further down the evolutionary chain. There is, however, proof that this view of evolution is inaccurate, and that the way animals of a social species navigate the evolutionary process is quite different. In his 1976 book entitled *The Selfish Gene*, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins introduced the "selfish-gene theory," which states that the goal of evolution is not the survival of the self, but rather the survival of one's genes (Dawkins, 2016). In other words, if another organism has genes that are similar enough to you, then supporting, caring for and ensuring that organism's well-being makes complete sense from an evolutionary standpoint, even more so than trying to harm that organism for a selfish advantage. With the survival of the gene in mind, empathy becomes the salient attribute in our "human nature," as it plays directly into evolution. This becomes clear when studying the habits of paleolithic humans who (along with many social species such as elephants and lions) have always maintained a small but consistent population of homosexual members in their tribes or packs; the added resources, support and care ensured the survival of the gene in a way that went beyond that of the survival of the self, or the subject of direct reproduction. Likewise, the act of risking one's life, putting other humans before oneself, or as Xunzi puts it, substituting oneself for another, all can come from the same place as one's instinct for food, rest, or warmth.

Xunzi's claim that external rituals are what create goodness in humanity, while humans are naturally incapable of goodness, falls apart in the face of evolutionary science. Not only do our fellow primates and other social species of animals have the capacity to exhibit primitive versions of being empathic, reconciliatory, and altruistic, but the very way in which our genes

describes goodness, and I propose that a clear connection can be made between Xunzi's idea of being correct (as it entails a mutual exchange of privileges) to reciprocity, ordered, peaceful and controlled (as all are part of the end result of restoring harmony) to reconciliation, and the idea of substituting oneself (being an action which first requires one to understand the feelings of another) to empathy. Empathy can be seen in the way chimpanzees console each other, often after one of them has lost a fight, usually by putting their arms around the other's shoulders (de Waal, 2016, pg. 32). One of de Waal's experiments has led to the discovery that chimpanzees sometimes reconcile after fights, showcasing surprisingly "human-like" behavior, as they hold their hands out to one another, then embrace and kiss each other (de Waal, 2016, pg. 18). In other words, chimps are capable of showing restraint after a fight, and control their impulses to an impressive degree. The most interesting experiment focused on the question of whether chimpanzees are capable of altruism, or whether they truly care about the wellbeing of others. The answer to this question is yes, as when a test subject was presented with the choice between two tokens, one which would result in the test subject being fed, the other resulting in both the test subject and a partner being fed, the test subject chose the second option most of the time (de Waal, 2016, pg. 47). This proves altruism because, for the test subject, it should not have mattered if the other chimp did not get fed, as this result would not have affected it physically in any way. Thus, the chimp made the choice of ensuring food for a partner with no immediate personal gain. The fact that chimps are cognitively capable of empathy, reciprocity, and reconciliation is proof that goodness, at the very least in the way Xunzi describes it, can be found naturally, and is not exclusive to external rituals and injunctions.

There is another way in which we can disprove Xunzi's claim that selflessness and morality is in opposition to human nature, by using the concept of natural selection. Natural

are passed down demonstrates that, from a biological and evolutionary standard, these attributes are deeply ingrained in our natural make-up as a species.

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David Uritu

Hi, my name is David Uritu, my pronouns are he/him, and I am a first-year undergraduate student majoring in English and Creative Writing. I developed an interest in philosophy throughout high school, specifically in how different philosophical movements relate and conflict with religion and religious thought. If I am not writing, I spend most of my time reading, watching movies, and playing guitar.

EXTRA CONTENT



INTERVIEWS, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMERICKS, AND MORE
TWO BIRDS BY KORA BURKE

LANDINI'S LIMERICKS

#1

A POPULAR SOMETHING CALLED NOTHING
SAID EVERYTHING'S MADE BY ITS STUFFING
IT HEMS AND HAWS
BUT NEVER GUFFAWS
IN PRETENDING IT'S MORE THAN JUST BLUFFING.

#2

LIVE THE EXAMINED LIFE!
IT'S A MOTTO TO MINIMIZE STRIFE.
BUT HOW TO INQUIRE?
IT'S NOT YET TO TRANSPIRE.
I WONDER, SAID SOCRATES'S WIFE.

#3

IF TIME IN A BLIND COULD BE KEPT
THE TIME OF THE MIND WOULD BE SLEPT
AWAKENED TO PERCEPTION
ONE'S OPEN TO DECEPTION.
BUT IT'S BETTER TO BE UP THAN INEPT..

#4

AN OLD PHILOSOPHICAL LESSON
HIDES WITHIN EVERY SCIENTIFIC QUESTION.
SHE WHO THINKS DEEPLY
NEVER ACTS SHEEPISHLY
ABOUT WHETHER TO BUCK A PROFESSION.



DR. GREGORY LANDINI

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

POET EXTRAORDINAIRE

MASTERMIND BEHIND THESE
LIMERICKS

SUBMIT YOUR REJOINDER: [JILLIAN-SCHENCK@UIOWA.EDU](mailto:jillian-schenck@uiowa.edu)

THE FIRST EVER LANDINI LIMERICK CONTEST

THERE'S A FAMOUS LIMERICK ABOUT BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY
WRITTEN BY RONALD KNOX:


THERE WAS A YOUNG MAN WHO SAID	"DEAR SIR: YOUR ASTONISHMENT'S
'GOD	ODD;
MUST FIND IT EXCEEDINGLY ODD	I AM ALWAYS ABOUT IN THE QUAD
TO THINK THAT THE TREE	AND THAT'S WHY THE TREE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE	WILL CONTINUE TO BE
WHEN THERE'S NO ONE ABOUT IN THE	SINCE OBSERVED BY, YOURS
QUAD."	FAITHFULLY, GOD".

CONTEST!
WRITE A
REJOINDER

AN EXAMPLE FROM DR. LANDINI:
GOOD SIR, PLEASE FORGIVE MY COMPLAINING
BUT YOUR PERCEPTION IS NOT MUCH SUSTAINING
FOR YOUR GODLY IDEA OF A TREE
A TREE, IT STILL CANNOT BE
MY ASTONISHMENT, I FEAR, IS REMAINING.

RECOMMENDATIONS


NHAT'S: ON BULLSHIT BY HARRY FRANKFURT




"While there are many reasons to read Harry Frankfurt's *On Bullshit*—the fact that it's only 68 pages, the funny name, and the ability to recommend a book titled *On Bullshit*, to name a few—the book is a prescient piece discussing the difference between bullshit and lying, the proliferation of bullshit, and the specific harms of bullshit. Despite its length (or lack thereof), Frankfurt's essay only gains more relevance by the day, especially considering the growth of fake news and political, to put it bluntly, bullshit. It is also one of those rare pieces of philosophy that is also fun to read. I highly recommend it to almost anyone, but especially those who are politically minded or have an interest in semantics (or bullshit)." - Nhat Tran

JILL'S: BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL BY FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

"In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Friedrich Nietzsche accuses most other philosophers— particularly those of the "classical" Christian tradition — of taking a dogmatic approach to their conception of morality. Nietzsche argues that many of the popular philosophical systems of the 18th and 19th centuries are erroneously built upon the idea that the good individual and the evil individual are mutually exclusive opposites. Nietzsche proposes instead that all individuals have evil impulses, and some individuals just present those impulses more blatantly than do others. As a philosophy major, even if I did not agree with everything he says, this was an interesting text to read— and I found it helpful to approach his work with some background information about the philosophers and philosophies he criticizes." - Jill Schenck




BLAKE'S: A GUIDE TO THE GOOD LIFE BY WILLIAM IRVINE



"In *A Guide to the Good Life*, Irvine provides a framework on how to live well in the modern world. He takes the reader through a history of stoicism and applies the wisdom of individuals like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius to hardships that many of us face on a day-to-day basis. Irvine simplifies the ideas of these great thinkers and presents a very accessible view of stoicism, while still having plenty to offer for readers already familiar with the subject. I highly recommend this book to anyone looking for a more fulfilling way to live, as the ideas within have the potential to be life-changing." - Blake Holmes

ALEXIS'S: WHAT ART IS BY ARTHUR C. DANTO

"As someone who is new to the field of aesthetics, Arthur C. Danto's *What Art Is* was the ideal book to be introduced to the philosophical ideas around both aesthetics and art. Not only does the reader get to learn about aesthetics, but Danto also provides wonderful art historical context around the artworks discussed and the artists who created them. I found that I was able to gain knowledge around the works of Duchamp and Warhol, as well as why some of their works are considered art, even if, to many people, they are just a urinal or Brillo box. This discussion from Danto is very pertinent to the current art world, in which viewers can often question the works of contemporary artists who continue to redefine *What Art Is*." - Alexis Redshaw



INTERVIEW WITH PROF. FUMERTON

BY ALEXIS REDSHAW

THIS INTERVIEW HAS BEEN EDITED FOR THE PURPOSES OF LENGTH AND CLARITY

WHAT INSPIRED YOU TO PURSUE PHILOSOPHY?

In junior high, I realized that class is a lot more interesting if you participate, and then, I found that I love to argue with people. It just made things so much more interesting, and I really didn't know much about philosophy until I went to university at the University of Toronto. Like a lot of students, I just took a couple of philosophy courses and fell in love with it. I didn't have a long-term career plan going into university. I was guided by sort of a hedonistic principle—if you find a course and you really enjoy taking that course, take more courses. That's how I became a philosophy major. Some of my professors suggested graduate school, so I applied to graduate schools. When you get your PhD in philosophy, one of the natural things to consider is a job in philosophy, and that's why I am here now. It was fun the whole time. I couldn't have imagined things going better than they did, as both an undergraduate and graduate, as it never felt like work—it always felt like fun.

WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT FIELDS OF STUDY, AND WHAT MADE YOU INTERESTED IN THEM?

I've got very broad interests in philosophy. In some respects, I am more the way philosophers used to be in the 19th century or the 18th century. There are some philosophers who have a very varied interest today, as well, but I've done research in and taught in epistemology, general metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, theoretical ethics and political philosophy, and I've done some research in some very theoretical sorts of philosophy of science, to name just a few. I started in epistemology—that was my first love, and it probably all stems from the first philosophy courses I took at the University of Toronto.

IS THERE AN AREA OF PHILOSOPHY THAT YOU HAVEN'T YET GOTTEN TO RESEARCH YET BUT STILL WANT TO?

Metaphysics is a very, very broad area of philosophy, so one of the books I wrote was called *Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth*, and that was a book that was focused on a very fundamental question: what exactly is truth, what are the bearers of truth value, what are their truth makers, how should we understand truth makers, in what sense is truth independent of mind and does it critically involve something that the mind brings to the world? Within metaphysics, though, there's another problem that I've always been interested in. I haven't written that much about it because I can't figure out how to solve the problem. That is the problem of universals. It's a very simple problem to state, and it's as ancient as philosophy itself. When you say of two things that they are both round, what is the roundness that characterizes both objects? One philosopher says, "Well, it's a single thing, roundness. It's there—in both that round thing and that round thing." Other philosophers say that, "No, there's some kind of similarity between that roundness," and they point to that roundness, "and that roundness," and they point to this other different roundness. But they're still distinct. The problem for that view is to account for why we use the predicate expression, the language, "is round" to characterize both of those things. It's a deceptively simple question, but it's a really, really hard question to answer. I've touched on it in some of my writing, but it's one these cases where I've always had this curiosity. I've always thought there's a problem there, and I need to figure out what the right view, a view that would satisfy me. I haven't managed to do it yet, so maybe someday.

WHAT CURRENT PROJECTS ARE YOU WORKING ON?

Well, I finished, more or less, the political philosophy projects. The next big project is a [book on] metaphilosophy, the philosophy of philosophy—what is philosophy?

WHAT PHILOSOPHERS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND SOMEONE READ WHEN BEGINNING THEIR STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY?

Descartes's *Meditations*. I don't have much original to say about this—Descartes's *Meditations*, Berkeley's *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. After they do those two, maybe Hume's *Treatise* and maybe Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy*. A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Knowledge*, but then, follow it up with his *Theory of Knowledge*. It's really interesting because you could see the difference between a really young philosopher who is very, very confident of all of his views and then a much older philosopher who's been reflecting a lot and sort of sees how complicated some of these issues are and isn't nearly as confident about what to say anymore. I think those books—Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Russell and A.J. Ayer. I may add one more book to that. It's a very short book and just a really good example of how you can write in a sophisticated way but also really accessible way. It's Perry's *Dialogues on Personal Identity*.

WHAT ADVICE WOULD YOU HAVE FOR SOMEONE WHO IS INTERESTED IN PURSUING A CAREER IN PHILOSOPHY?

Make sure, as an undergrad, once you start getting hooked on it, make sure you get a really sound, fundamental undergraduate education in philosophy. By that I mean, make sure you take courses in a wide range of areas. Because even if you think you know what you're going to end up specializing in, you might change your mind. So, you want a good background in all of the fundamental areas of philosophy. Then, come the practical questions. You're going to end up applying to graduate school. The trivial advice is do really well, do as well as you possibly can, in those undergraduate courses. Make sure you take advantage of opportunities to talk with professors, especially outside of class, but also your fellow students. Don't think of it as, "That class is over. I'm done." When you get interested in something, continue the conversation. Get lots of advice when it comes to applying to graduate schools. You want to get into graduate schools with the best reputations, but you also want some safety schools. You want some really good schools that maybe aren't quite as hard to get into but still are very good philosophy programs. Make absolutely sure when you go to graduate school that you've gotten a teaching assistantship or fellowship—some kind of financial aid. The wonderful thing about going for a PhD in philosophy, and some of the other humanities, is that with financial support, you're not going to end up with some huge financial debt. Our graduate students they get—I mean you can't live high off the hog on the kind of money you get as a graduate student, but you can live well enough, and your tuition will be waived, usually, with most programs. You finish with your PhD, and you don't have massive debt.

Getting advice the whole way through's really important. You need the good grades. You want to do well on the GRE. They involve some practice. Some people think, "I don't need to practice for them," but actually, you do. You can get better through practice. You want to get a lot of help on your writing sample. Don't just pick your favorite paper from your days as an undergraduate. You could start with that, but then, go talk to me or two or three other people in the Department. Ask them if you should revise the paper in any way to make it stronger as your writing sample. Because people will, once you get past a certain cut off, they will look at that, and they will make some judgments about your philosophical potential from your writing sample. It's really important.

If you go to graduate school in philosophy, enjoy the whole thing. Be disciplined, you know, work hard when you need to, but the best years of your life, you know, when you're young like that. If you can, find a place you'd like to live that's a good place to live. Make sure you're a well-rounded person. Don't just immerse yourself completely in philosophy. When you have that attitude about the whole thing, I think it's a great choice working and going for a graduate degree in philosophy. If you can get that tenure-track job at the end of the whole process, it's, as I've said to you before, it's the best job a person can have.

IF YOU COULD HAVE DINNER WITH ANY PHILOSOPHER, DEAD OR ALIVE, WHO WOULD IT BE AND WHY?

I think it would probably be Hume, David Hume. David Hume or Thomas Hobbes. You know, maybe it would be Hobbes because I'm very sympathetic with the way he approaches a lot of philosophy, but there's some moves he makes at certain points, and I just don't know why he made them. It doesn't seem to me that it's what he should have said, if I understand the rest of what he was writing. So, that would be a really interesting person to have dinner with and just ask him about the stuff I've always wondered about, and then, we could always play tennis afterwards. He played a lot of—it wasn't quite tennis—it was an indoor game, and you could play the ball off the wall. I think you could play it off the ceiling, too, but otherwise, it was very much like tennis. He loved to play it, apparently. People always joke that he'd probably be cheating the whole time, but apparently, he was a very nice guy. He was a lot of fun to be around, so it would be either Hobbes or Hume.



ABOUT THE JOURNAL



MINOTAUR
BY KORA BURKE

ABOUT LABYRINTH

WHY LABYRINTH?

Plato uses the image of a winding labyrinth as a metaphor for the process of philosophical investigation in his dialogue *Euthydemus*. His image expresses his belief that unlike the arts of rhetoric or sophistry—which rely on mere assertion and counter-assertion—philosophy absolutely requires that we retrace our steps in an argument and constantly re-examine our view in order to arrive at knowledge of the true and good. This is what we philosophy students aim to do, and this journal is meant to aid in that process.

OUR PURPOSE

This journal was created with a threefold purpose. First, to provide undergraduate philosophy students with the experience and opportunity of publishing a paper in a philosophical journal. Second, to give an opportunity for students to be involved in peer-to-peer interaction through the editorial and overall journal creation process. Finally, to showcase the amazing philosophical work that is being done by the undergraduate students at the University of Iowa.

ATTENTION STUDENTS!

Please consider submitting a paper for the Fall 2021 issue, as the continuation of this journal relies on students like you. All submissions undergo a blind peer review to ensure a fair selection process. For further inquiries, contact Professor Carrie Swanson at carrie-swanson@uiowa.edu

THE TEAM




Nhat Tran - Editor-in-Chief

Hey y'all! My name is Nhat Tran, my pronouns are he/they, and I'm a second-year undergraduate student double majoring in Philosophy and Psychology. While I love metaphysics and philosophy of mind (thank you, Dr. Perovic!), I'm specifically interested in the philosophy of mental illness and the philosophy of psychiatry, in the hopes of becoming a therapist. I identify as non-binary, I run games of Dungeons and Dragons, and I make a mean Thai curry.

Alexis Redshaw - Editor

Hey there! My name is Alexis Redshaw, and my pronouns are she/her/hers. I am a junior studying ethics and public policy on the pre-law track. I am currently minoring in philosophy and art history, in which the latter has developed my interest in pursuing a career in art law! Along with being on the editorial team for *Labyrinth*, I am the current president of UI Circle K, as well as historian of Big Brothers Big Sisters at Iowa. If I am not doing endless amounts of practice problems in preparation for the LSAT, I am spending time with my miniature dachshund, Olive!



Blake Holmes - Editor

Blake is a senior majoring in interdepartmental studies, with a minor in philosophy. He is on the pre-medical track and hopes to attend medical school starting in 2022. This is Blake's second semester editing *Labyrinth*. In addition to editing, Blake works as a research assistant, volunteers at the Ulowa Food Pantry, and enjoys playing the piano.

Jill Schenck- Editor

Hi! My name is Jill (she/hers) and I am a third-year student majoring in Philosophy and Ethics and Public Policy with a minor in Computer Science. I am a violist in the University of Iowa Symphony Orchestra and drink way too much tea. When I am not studying or practicing, I like to read and play *Animal Crossing: New Horizons*. This is my first semester editing *Labyrinth*.



ART CREDITS



Kora Burke

My name is Kora Burke, my pronouns are she/her/hers. I am a junior at the University of Iowa studying Art Education. Nothing is more valuable to me than creativity and imagination. The visual arts is my passion and teaching is my purpose. I hope to encourage students to practice self expression and invention in my classroom.

SPECIAL THANKS

We would like to thank Kora Burke for her artwork, Dr. Gregory Landini for the limericks, and Dr. Carrie Swanson for all of her support.

We couldn't have done it without you all!

EDITOR'S NOTE

I must say, I'm rather proud of this edition of *Labyrinth*. While still within the midst of a raging pandemic, we not only managed to create a wonderful journal that celebrates the philosophical talents found within the University of Iowa, but we did so on a much shorter timeline while incorporating so much more, including content such as limericks and book recommendations, author and editor bios, and even student artwork. With that in mind, I want to give a big thanks to all those involved in the process of creating this journal.

I'd first like to thank the authors of the featured papers, as, without their submissions, there would be nothing to publish. As well, I would also like to thank those that helped us create the additional material found in the journal: thank you to Dr. Fumerton and Dr. Landini for their contributions to this edition of *Labyrinth*, and a big thanks to Kora Burke for her amazing artwork.

I want to give an enormous thanks to my fellow editors, Blake, Alexis, and Jill, not only for their immense contributions and help in creating this edition of the journal, but also for being patient with me throughout this whole process. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Swanson, as, without her, there would be no *Labyrinth*.

This is my second semester leading the editorial board for *Labyrinth*, and the fact that I'm transferring in the fall probably means it is my last. With that being the case, I am so happy that this edition is the one that I will end off on.

To everyone involved: thank you. We could not have done this without you.

Sincerely,

Nhat Tran (he/they)

Editor-in-Chief

